

Introduction

The setting is the dining room of Pierson College at Yale University during the academic year 1956–1957, where the Fellows of Pierson College had lunch together every other Wednesday or so. These Fellows consisted of some of the most famous professors at Yale (if not also in academia at large) from a variety of academic disciplines.

As a freshman “bursary” student, that is, a work-scholarship student, assigned to clearing the tables in the Pierson College dining room, it was possible to listen in on the conversation of the Fellows. In fact, there was a temptation to linger while clearing the tables, taking in as much of their conversation as possible. Their erudition obviously made a strong impression, but the biggest impression of all was made by the civility of discourse during specific discussions in which there was strong disagreement of opinion. As a result of this experience, it became an assumption, if not a belief, that such civility of discourse characterized the behavior of famous scholars whenever they engaged in intellectual debate with their colleagues.

Years later, as an independent scholar who still believed that civility of discourse and debate was a hallmark of the academic world, I had no hesitation to attempt to publish some information and hypotheses that contradicted what was being taught as a paradigm in art history classrooms, and what was written in art history textbooks, monographs, encyclopedias, and so on. The Guido Riccio debate among scholars, thus, formally began in 1977 with a small article in which the traditional attribution to the famous artist Simone Martini for the large equestrian portrait of the mercenary soldier Guido Riccio da Fogliano was contested (Moran, 1977). This large wall painting located in the Palazzo Pubblico museum in Siena, Italy, not only is famous among art historians, but is also a major tourist attraction that is reproduced extensively in Siena and Italy on the covers of guidebooks, posters for tourist agencies, posters for tennis tournaments, plates, ashtrays, lampshades, bathroom tile decoration, and even wine bottle labels.

I did not expect that all other scholars would immediately agree that this famous painting was painted by someone other than Simone Martini, but at the very least I expected that any debate that ensued would proceed with a civility of discourse more or less similar to that of the Pierson College Fellows in 1956–1957. Instead, the Guido Riccio controversy, which is still ongoing, has been characterized by, among other things, insults, censorship, and falsifications, all directed toward silencing the new, unwanted hypotheses. This situation intensified to such a degree that I received a request to write an article on the case from the standpoint of “Resistance to Critical Thinking” (Moran & Mallory, 1991a). More recently, I received another request to write a chapter on the subject for a book entitled *Confronting the Experts* (Mallory & Moran, 1996).

What happened? Was it simply foolishly naive to assume, much less believe, that civility of discourse and debate, based on scholarly critical analysis, extended beyond groups of scholars such as the Pierson College Fellows? Or, was it a case of confusing interdisciplinary collegiality among a small, close-knit group of scholars who lunched together regularly with the reality of debate within a specific academic discipline on an international level? In any case, the reactions of the art history community, in the face of various scholarly evidence, created such a great sense of surprise that I felt that such reactions must be an exception rather than the norm.

At one point, Stewart and Feder, scholars in the field of biomedical research, having heard of censorship attempts in the Guido Riccio case, got in touch with me to compare notes and to seek advice on how to overcome censorship that they were facing at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and elsewhere in the scientific community. This contact led to a study of some of the “file” studies of Serge Lang (mathematics department, Yale University) dealing with problems of censorship and responsibility among the higher echelons of the scientific community, including the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). At that point, it became obvious that problems encountered in the Guido Riccio debate occurred elsewhere in academia as well, and also that such problems extended beyond the specific subject matter of specific academic disciplines, involving, in effect, larger problems of peer review, scholarly communication, and information management. These larger problems involved the work of information scientists, academic librarians, historians of science and medicine, and sociologists. In several cases, I have compared experiences in the Guido Riccio case with situations in science that relate to problems of peer review and academic librarianship, and these studies were published in *Library Trends* (Moran & Mallory, 1991b), *The Indexer* (Mallory & Moran, 1994), and *The Reference Librarian* (Moran, 1991).

In the midst of these studies of scholarly communication that incorporated the Guido Riccio case with similar cases in the sciences, a book appeared that turned out to be crucial: *Silencing Science* (Relyea, 1994). It contains a thorough and vivid account of how, in the name of national security, attempts were made to withhold certain scientific information from the Soviet Union during the 1980s. Relyea’s work shows how power, on the part of individuals and institutions, overcame the principles

of academic freedom and intellectual freedom. Throughout his book, Relyea asserted that the censorship and suppression in this case were contrary to traditional scientific communication, which is marked by "open communication and free sharing of information" (p. 6), and he stated that "the practice of openness became institutionalized" (p. 9) from around the second half of the 17th century.

The question arose whether the assertion or belief that "openness became institutionalized" was any different from the assumption or belief that scholars who disagreed with each other in academic debates used the same civility of discourse that the Pierson College Fellows did in 1956–1957 when they disagreed with each other. In other words, was the systematic suppression and censorship of some types of scientific information during the 1980s the exception, or was it business as usual in the sense that those in power who feel inclined to suppress information, for whatever reason, might attempt to do so? This question lingered.

Thus, an expansion on the theme of "silencing" in academia seemed warranted. M. Nissani (personal communication, June 11, 1996) suggested that if research were conducted for "any period in the history of any natural science," a large amount of rejection and suppression of new ideas would be revealed. Obviously such a study is beyond the scope of this book. At the same time, a study of how scholars are silenced, and why scholars are silenced, based to a large extent on selective case studies, can build on Relyea's (1994) work within the context of information management, policy, and services.

In fact, with the use of the term *silencing*, Relyea (1994) seemed to invite, or provoke, discussion of an expansion on some themes in his book. Silencing is a more encompassing term than censorship, suppression, or peer-review rejection. Silencing takes place at various levels: A scholar might be silenced, an idea might be silenced, and the truth might be silenced by a big lie. In some cases, scholars might be able to overcome specific attempts to silence them, but the ideas in their published work might have little or no impact on what is taught in the classroom, what is published in textbooks and reference books, or what becomes public health policy or foreign policy. Thus, despite numerous publications, a scholar's ideas can, in all practicality, be silenced as a result of lack of impact. As I show, when such silencing based on lack of impact results in the silencing of the truth, great harm can be done.

Silence is not only imposed, in some cases, on scholars and ideas, but silence is also employed, by academic leaders and peer review authorities, for instance, as a tactic. Letters are not answered. Requests to present papers at scholarly conferences are not acknowledged (much less taken into consideration). When a pattern of such silence develops, the situation is called *stonewalling*.

Several of the chapters in this book cover material that could easily be expanded into book length, and not all of the pertinent material can be included in this book. There is no intention of giving a history of intellectual suppression, or a full discussion of peer review in all its aspects. Rather, the theme of silencing of scholars is illustrated by means of various case studies from the past as well as the present. Within such a context, this book is also intended as an appeal: one to academic peer-review

authorities to live up to the rhetoric of openness, open discussion, open debate, and free exchange of ideas among scholars. It is also intended as an appeal to academic librarians to broaden the concept of "free flow of information" to include information that is the subject matter of both (or all) sides of academic controversies. Within the framework of these appeals, the contents of some of the chapters in this book are overlapping and intertwined. Some of the source material that is referred to and cited in order to illustrate some of the case studies may be hitherto unknown to some readers, even though some of this material was published years ago and has had rather wide distribution. One of the reasons such material might be unknown to readers is that there have been rather successful efforts to silence the material, as far as the mainstream of academic literature is concerned.

In a certain sense, any book about the silencing of scholars at any time in history might be seen against a backdrop in which the "whole picture is one of a power struggle where the odds against innovation are great but the addition of the innovator to truth is supreme" (de Grazia, 1978, p. 200). The major forces, or factors, against innovation would include paradigm protection, and so-called turf protection. Along this line, in an article in *Science* about controversies in astronomy, Burbidge was quoted as saying, "When we come across things we don't like we cut them off, we referee them to death" (Marshall, 1990, p. 16). For the purposes of this book, terms such as *cut off* or *referee to death* are equivalents of silence. If a new hypothesis is successfully cut off, it is silenced. To the extent that peer-review authorities manage to referee a new idea to death, that idea is silenced as far as the mainstream academic literature and teaching are concerned.

Under such circumstances, it would seem that many scholars who come up with ideas and discoveries that peer-review authorities "don't like" might become resigned to being silenced to some degree regarding such ideas and discoveries, and, as a result, turn their scholarly attention elsewhere. They might rather switch than fight. (They might also be aware that if they fight and lose, they might eventually be forced to switch anyway, as far as a career is concerned.)

However, some scholars resent being silenced and do not give up easily in their attempts to be heard and to make an impact. In the book *Confronting the Experts*, Sharma (1996) asserted that he performed best "when in confrontation with powerful authorities" (p. 173). From a similar standpoint, a book about silencing of scholars amounts to investigations of academic confrontations involving strong vested interests—of a personal or institutional nature—battling against the academic equivalent of what the famous poet Byron referred to as the "Eternal Spirit of the chainless Mind."

Silencing of Scholars Within Totalitarian and Democratic Forms of Government

In his book *Heidegger and Nazism*, Farias (1989) stated that under the law only those scholars who completed political indoctrination courses were granted the right to teach in German universities (p. 194). Cude (1987a) referred to Lysenko as “the biologist who arranged the banishment to the gulag of his intellectual rivals during Stalin’s time” (p. 61). Hitler was the enemy of Stalin during World War II, but both leaders had a common bond regarding higher education; namely, the policy that the government was in control of who could teach and what could be taught. Scholars who did not conform were silenced. No matter what the political ideology is, in a totalitarian government those who have political power have the power to silence scholars within their academic systems. The government censors and suppresses unwanted information and ideas.

PUNISHMENT OF DISSIDENTS AND THE BIG LIE

In theory and in practice, in totalitarian states scholars *can* write and communicate—in secret—ideas that are banned by the government. They can also try to

smuggle them out of the country and have them published under a false name. In this sense, complete silencing is virtually impossible. However, these secret writings do not get into the mainstream scholarly literature of the country and are not taught in the classrooms (where monitors might be stationed to make sure that dissident views are not expressed).

If scholars in a totalitarian state attempt to challenge the system or its leaders openly, these scholars might end up in mental institutions for experiments with drugs that attempt to bring about thought control. Even a passive attitude toward the official government ideology might result in punishment. In a movie that depicted university life under Nazi rule, a professor was lecturing on the composition of human blood. He was asked (by a monitor, either an official monitor, or a self-appointed one) if the blood of Aryans was different than that of non-Aryans. The professor stated that it might be true, but as far as he knew, there was no scientific proof for it. This was enough, according to the script, to have the professor sent to prison and fired from the university. He died shortly thereafter in prison (it was not clear if he was killed from hard labor or was actually executed).

The silencing of scholars in totalitarian regimes is an extension of government control of speech by individuals, control of the press, and control of mass media. Truth is not as important as various forms of expression that will help prop up and strengthen the specific totalitarian form of government. In such a case, the Big Lie technique can replace the search for truth. On an evening radio broadcast in the wake of the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, and during the process of reunification of Germany, it was announced that textbooks in East German schools had to be changed, that much of the content of the present textbooks was untrue and now obsolete. These textbooks might be regarded as part of the Big Lie technique, which is often taken for granted as an integral part of a totalitarian system.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM

By contrast, in democratic societies, academic freedom is a logical extension of freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Academic associations and professional scholarly societies often have their own policy statements of commitment to academic freedom incorporated into their charters, regulations, or other documents. The same is true for specific institutions of higher learning.

Within the library profession, the concepts of First Amendment freedom of speech, and of academic freedom in universities, find equivalents in terms such as intellectual freedom, free flow of information, and the "freedom to read" ideal (Cornog & Perper, 1992, p. 12). Some librarians take an activist attitude and role in intellectual freedom activities (often associated with anticensorship activity).

The underlying principle of these various concepts of freedom of expression is that the government does not have the right to interfere with or curtail freedom of expression of individuals, private groups, or institutions. If the principles of the First

Amendment, academic freedom, intellectual freedom, freedom to read, and the free flow of information were all combined in practice, it would seem impossible to silence scholars. Not only would scholars be free to write and teach whatever they want to, but their ideas would be included in the free flow of information.

SILENCING SCHOLARS BY LAWS AND LAWSUITS

In practice and in reality, however, there are various ways to silence scholars in democratic societies. Some of these are legalistic. In *Silencing Science*, Relyea's (1994) excellent discussion of "national security" shows that the term can be used in various ways, ranging from a narrow definition to a very broad, encompassing one. Some scientific and technological information, and scholars who discuss this information, can be silenced in the name of national security, which allegedly has priority over academic freedom if there is a conflict between them. The broader the definition, the greater the possibility legally to restrict ideas and information and to deny access to some scholarly material, all of which can result in silencing scholars to one degree or another.

Although, as Relyea (1994) pointed out, there has been much disagreement about how far the definition of national security should be extended, there is general agreement about the logical necessity, particularly in wartime, for legal restrictions and secrecy based on national security concerns. The contents of such restrictions can have silencing effects on scholars, particularly scientists. The greater the sense of urgency or emergency, the more likely scholars are inclined to sacrifice their academic freedom on a temporary basis in the interests of national security. Problems begin, however, as Relyea (1994) pointed out, when there are attempts to silence scholars in the name of national security when it is not clear that such urgency or emergency exists. At that point, scholars might feel that the term *national security* is being used as an excuse for censorship and suppression.

National security, however, is not the only form of restriction based on law. Libel and defamation laws also play a role in the silencing of scholars. The government utilizes national security controls, but individuals and institutions can utilize libel and defamation laws to try to silence scholars. Like national security, *libel* and *defamation* are terms that can be quite elastic and subject to varying interpretations. Not all libel laws are exactly the same, and not all judges interpret them in exactly the same manner. Even the mere threat of a libel or defamation suit might scare some scholars, and even editors of scholarly publications, into silence, not necessarily because of the likely outcome (winning or losing), but merely because of the large sums of money and long hours of time and effort that might be required to fight a lawsuit.

A few recent examples can demonstrate how such lawsuits, whether they are followed through to a legal judgment, or whether they are withdrawn long before a legal judgment would have been made, can silence scholars and editors. A rather scary story—scary from the standpoint of academic freedom—is told in the first person by

Beck (1993) in *Art Restoration: The Culture, the Business and the Scandal*. Beck was chair of the art history department at Columbia University in New York City. His main field of study is Italian Renaissance art, and his specialty is the art of Jacopo della Quercia, a 15th-century sculptor from Siena. Beck is regarded as a leading expert on Jacopo della Quercia, and on Quercia's masterpiece, the sculptural portrait known as *Ilaria*, located in the Tuscan town of Lucca.

The sculpture of *Ilaria* was recently restored. As Beck (1993) told it, an artist who saw the restored work was taken back by how different it looked after the restoration. Beck was asked to look at the restored work, which he eventually did, and he, too, was surprised by the result of the restoration. He disapproved of how the work of art now looks, and in his role as a specialist in the field of study, he gave a negative judgment about the restoration, and he called for an open debate and discussion about it. His remarks were reported in various newspapers and on television, perhaps not only because he was a leading expert on the subject, but also because he had previously harshly criticized the restoration of the famous Sistine Chapel paintings in the Vatican, setting off a bitter controversy.

In the wake of the newspaper and television coverage, the person who restored the *Ilaria* sculpture sued Beck for defamation in courts in Torino, Livorno, and Firenze (i.e., the cities where the press had reported his negative criticisms). Of the three suits, the most dramatic one took place in Firenze, because, as Beck (1993) recounted it, the judge decided, even before the evidence was presented, that he would be convicted. By pure chance, according to Beck, a person overheard the judge making the conviction comment to the restorer's lawyer in a hallway near the courtroom. It was reported to Beck's lawyer, and eventually to Beck himself and protest was made to the judicial body that oversees the judiciary.

If he had been convicted, Beck would have become a silenced scholar, and the upshot and ramifications of the case might well have caused many other scholars to become silent, out of fear that they, too, might be convicted before the evidence was heard in court. Such fear could silence many important critical scholarly judgments that otherwise might have been expressed in specialized fields of study. This situation would seem to represent one of the greatest chilling factors in academia.

As it turned out, Beck won the lawsuit, and, as a result, he has become more vociferous. Among other things, he founded an organization called ArtWatch International, Inc., dedicated to the protection of works of art, similar to organizations dedicated to the protection of human rights or protection of the environment. Obviously, one of the purposes of Beck's organization is to protect works of art from bad restorations. Furthermore, before major restorations are made on works that are masterpieces and considered to be part of the artistic patrimony belonging to all mankind, Beck (1993) proposed open debate and discussion among specialists, scholars, and other interested persons, relating to the necessity of the restoration and to the type of restoration that will be made.

There have been further attempts to silence Beck now that he is engaged in ArtWatch activity. One of these attempts to silence him has led to a paradoxical twist,

as it is Beck who has taken legal action against a famous art historian after this art historian wrote very negative judgments about Beck, and after these strongly negative comments got into the Italian news media. Beck (1996) wrote in an ArtWatch letter, "I was accused of being 'presumptuous' and 'ignorant' by a distinguished art historian.... The language used was so extraordinary that I have filed a court petition" (p. 2). All of this is a far cry from the civility of debate that marked the disagreements among the Pierson College Fellows, and it seems very strange that debates about art restoration techniques can take place in courtrooms instead of at cordial luncheons, scholarly conferences, or in scholarly publications.

Not all scholars fare as well as Beck did in court in relation to the Ilaria restoration case, however, and it seems that the outcome for Beck himself would have been much different if someone had not overheard, by chance, the indiscreet words of a judge. The case of Hans Ruesch may break all records (or come close to breaking all records) in terms of the number of legal actions taken against a scholar and the scholar's organization. Ruesch is a scholar of the history of medicine, although many persons may regard him as being famous for his skill as a racing car driver, or for his ability as a writer of best-selling novels.

Much of Ruesch's scholarly work is directed toward demonstrating that animal experimentation in medical research can be unreliable, misleading, and very dangerous when results based on such experimentation are used as models for humans. (Some of his studies and ideas are discussed in other chapters of this book.) He reported that between 1989 and early 1996, more than 70 legal actions were taken against him by persons connected with the medical and pharmaceutical establishment. In one of his recent publications, *International Foundation Report*, Ruesch (1993) related that, as a result of these legal actions, some publication plans of the Centre d'Information Vivisectionniste International Scientifique (CIVIS) have been held up (and, thus, silenced, at least for a period of time): "CIVIS had planned an important publication program which lay within our possibilities three years ago. Uninterrupted legal actions conducted against Hans Ruesch through the Swiss courts ... prevented the realization of our program" (p. 16).

Although he has not been completely silenced, much of Ruesch's time, energy, and financial resources have been taken up by the legal actions against him. The sheer number of such actions seems to imply that they function as harassment. As a scholar, Ruesch is being silenced to the extent that time, energy, and financial burdens required to fight the legal actions prevent him from writing, publishing, and giving lectures on his scholarly material.

ROLLING STONE, AIDS RESEARCH, AND A LAWSUIT

Another interesting and revealing attempt to silence scholarly discussion is found in the case involving Tom Curtis, *Rolling Stone* magazine, and Hilary Koprowski. Koprowski, formerly head of Wistar Institute, developed a polio vaccine that was

used on a massive experimental basis in Africa (in the region of the former Belgian Congo) in the 1950s. The production of this vaccine involved the use of kidneys from monkeys. Some scholars formulated the hypothesis that the so-called HIV virus, because of its similarity to some simian viruses, was transmitted to humans from monkeys. There were also hypotheses made that the virus jumped the species gap from monkey to man as a result of the polio vaccine experiments in Africa in the 1950s.

Curtis (1992) a freelance investigative journalist, recounted these hypotheses in an article in *Rolling Stone*. Obviously, these hypotheses were very upsetting to many persons in the medical research establishment, and particularly to Koprowski. As a result, Koprowski sued both Curtis and *Rolling Stone*.

Based on principles of truth, falsehood, and malice that are inherent in libel cases in the United States, it did not seem that Curtis would lose the case. Hypotheses were presented as hypotheses, as far as can be determined, and the hypotheses discussed in the article were not inventions of Curtis, but were formulated by other scholars. Besides, another scholar—Louis Pascal—had independently formulated similar hypotheses, and Pascal's (1991) work was published as part of a series of studies by the University of Wollongong. I predicted (G. Moran, personal communication, June 10, 1993; personal communication, November 5, 1993; personal communication, November 18, 1993) that Koprowski would not win his lawsuit, and that the settlement reached would be claimed as a victory for Koprowski. That is what happened.

The lawsuit itself might have created a dampening effect (or chilling effect, to use a common buzzword in academia) on subsequent studies about the relation of polio vaccines to the HIV virus, although there have been some attempts to discuss the issues in various forums. Scholars have been silenced to the extent that the lawsuit has discouraged scholarly discussion and more profound scientific investigations of the subject.

SLAPP SUITS

Some lawsuits that are made primarily to silence criticism are known as *SLAPP suits*. In one case, Yeshiva University sued Leonard Minsky. In an article (Greenberg, 1990) that discusses this lawsuit, Minsky claimed that Yeshiva's action was a "legalistic ploy to silence criticism, otherwise known as a SLAPP suit, for 'Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation'" (p. 6). From the standpoint of silencing scholars, it seems significant and revealing that this type of lawsuit has attained a formal name and designation. It is possible that the suits against Beck, Ruesch, and Curtis (as well as against many others attempting to get involved in scholarly discussions or investigations) are of this nature. When such types of lawsuits are used to silence scholars, they become a SLAPP in the face to academic freedom.

LOGISTICAL FACTORS

In addition to legal restraints on academic freedom and the free flow of information, there are also logistical restraints of a practical nature. One of the most obvious is the problem of selectivity. Individual libraries are not able to acquire and process everything that has been written, nor can scholars read and study everything that has been published. Scholars cannot teach, in a single course, everything that has been published on the subject matter of the course, nor can students be expected to read all of the pertinent material as outside reading.

Before the age of electronic publishing, selectivity was already a major problem for peer-review authorities and librarians. Electronic publishing has compounded these problems. Selectivity can also be an excuse for suppression. Although it is true that all papers that have been submitted for a scholarly conference might not be able to be on the program of the conference because of lack of time to read all of them within the time limit of the conference, who knows how many times papers (or manuscripts for articles) have been rejected for "reasons" of time or space when, in fact, the real reason for rejection was that peer-review authorities did not approve of the subject matter.

Also, in some cases, nonselection of a scholarly work might not be the result of deliberate suppression, but instead, the result of a lack of understanding or comprehension of the significance of a work. Whatever the reasons for nonselection, the logistical necessity for selectivity is a major factor in the silencing of scholars. To the extent that scholars' works are not selected, the ideas of these scholars are silenced.

BUREAUCRATIC IMPEDIMENTS

In totalitarian states, centralized governments control the flow of information. In democracies, academic freedom and the free flow of information are, in theory, free of government control. To be completely free of government control, academic freedom and the free flow of information would be in the private realm. In reality, however, much research and scholarship is funded and subsidized by governments, and permission is needed from government agencies to begin and carry out such research. This is particularly true in the field of archaeology, for example. Excavations require a lot of bureaucratic paperwork before the actual research can get underway. If permission is denied, potential important discoveries might not be made. In such cases, denial of permission would create a silence barrier for specific subject matter. Thus, even in democracies there can be a large amount of government control of research and scholarship, based on funding policies and bureaucratic procedures.

Likewise, scientific research sponsored by governments might reflect certain biases, preferences, or priorities of government leaders, who in turn implement bureaucratic procedures to carry out specific research programs. President Richard M. Nixon

announced a "war" against cancer. At present, AIDS research is a top priority in some countries.

Such research programs, however, often have certain restraints on the type of research that will be subsidized, to the extent that there is a monolithic rather than open approach to the subject matter. To the extent that scholars' research remains outside of the approach dictated by the bureaucracy, the scholars' ideas might be silenced (examples are discussed in subsequent chapters).

ACADEMIC POLITICS, CAREERS, PARADIGMS, AND "TURF"

The top career positions in an academic discipline include, for instance, head of department (chairs), dean, officers of professional societies and learned societies, editors (and advisors) and peer-review referees of scholarly publications, officials of grant-approving organizations, editors and consultants (advisors) of scholarly reference works, directors and officers of research centers, and directors and organizers of scholarly conferences. There are fewer such positions than there are career-minded scholars competing for these positions. These positions, and the academic, bureaucratic, and financial power that go with them, represent the "turf" of the scholars who have attained and hold such positions. In general, there are several factors that determine, to one degree or another, whether a scholar will attain one or more of these prestigious academic positions. These include productivity (publication of books, articles, and papers given at scholarly conferences), reputation (as teacher, lecturer, or researcher), and academic politics.

The prestige associated with these various positions conveys an aura of authority and implies that the scholars who hold these positions are among the leading experts in their fields of study. The concepts of authority and expertise, in this case, are based on knowledge that has become a body of paradigms within a given academic discipline. It would follow that if new discoveries, findings, ideas, and hypotheses demonstrate—or even indicate—that paradigms believed to be true (and taught as if they were the truth) were, in fact, false, then the aforementioned authority and expertise are placed in doubt. As Schneider (1989) pointed out, "If the knowledge expounded by recognized scholars to their students should prove to be of dubious reliability, then their authority is open to question. Thus, scientific progress and changing theories are natural enemies of authoritarian tradition" (p. 137).

Paradigm busting, or even the mere serious challenge to an entrenched paradigm, can thus create unsure footing for specific academic turf, or place the turf on slippery grounds, as the case may be. At the very least, paradigm-busting ideas prove to be uncomfortable for those scholars who possess the turf. Along this line, Schneider (1989) observed that the "rise and fall of empirical and rational science is mirrored by the rise and fall of scholars and experts who represent that science" (p. 147). As a result, there is a tendency for those who enjoy a reputation of authority and expertise to discourage the publication and discussion of scholarly material that might

undermine such authority and expertise. Such discouragement can take place at various levels: awarding of degrees (particularly the PhD), promotion, tenure, peer-review rejection or acceptance of publication of books and articles, participation in scholarly conferences, awarding of research grants, and collegial acceptance or ostracism on the part of colleagues. To the extent that scholars have had paradigm-busting ideas rejected from publication or discussion, and to the extent that scholars have not expressed such ideas out of fear of consequences for their careers, these scholars have been silenced.

SILENCING OF SCHOLARS WHO ATTEMPT TO CORRECT ERROR

In the field of biomedical research, Margot O'Toole detected what she believed was a serious error in a published article (for which she had been involved in the basic research). She felt it was her duty as a scientist to correct the error. In an article, Lang (1993) published her testimony describing a meeting with a high university official: "He told me to charge fraud or drop the matter entirely" (p. 8). In the same article, Lang reproduced part of a letter from David Baltimore to Edward Rall, a high official of the NIH. Baltimore did not approve of NIH scholars Walter Stewart and Ned Feder being involved with the correction of the alleged error that O'Toole detected. Baltimore suggested a commission ("a couple of immunologists") to review the data, and asserted that Stewart and Feder must accept the commission's conclusions: "They must agree to abide by whatever decisions are reached. This means they must promise to cease all discussions of this issue" (p. 15). All scholars involved in the correction of scholarly error who, on the advice or instructions of academic authorities, decide to "drop the matter entirely," or to "cease all discussion" are being silenced. It seems clear that such advice and instructions are contrary to principles of openness and the free exchange of ideas among scholars.

If a situation boils down to a choice between career enhancement or speaking out, scholars might decide on silence instead of speaking out, particularly if they are in the categories somewhere between PhD candidates and professors seeking tenure. Even when tenure and career enhancement have been achieved, however, scholars might be tempted to maintain silence in order to avoid endangering bonds of collegiality with colleagues. If they propose, or even support, paradigm-busting ideas, or if they support someone like O'Toole in the correction of error, their actions might be considered betrayal of their colleagues' authority and expertise.

In *Confronting the Experts*, Hillman (1996) wrote:

There are so many academics, doctors, teachers, and publishers who have a vested interest in current views ... in Britain at least—where academic tenure has been virtually abolished—it is unlikely that anyone who raised the fundamental questions or came to the same conclusions publicly as Mr. Sartory and I have, would ever be appointed to a

lectureship, be awarded a large grant for research, or enjoy a successful career in science. (p. 125)

Hillman (1991) added that it “is not surprising that the grant-giving bodies, the research councils and scientific advisory committees, are composed of academics and research directors who support conventional beliefs” (p. 261).

SILENCING OF DISSIDENT SCHOLARS AND UNORTHODOX RESEARCH

After achieving success and esteem in his career in biomedical research, Duesberg (1996) raised some serious questions about orthodox AIDS research. Not long thereafter, “the AIDS establishment directed its power toward isolating and neutralizing Duesberg within scientific circles” (p. 396). Isolating and neutralizing individuals are part of the silencing process, as far as scholarly ideas are concerned.

Lang described some “strong forces which inhibit criticism” in academia:

One of these forces is “collegiality.” ... There are other forces of intimidation of various kinds ... some influential academics are giving priority to protecting their tribe; they close ranks behind each other; they give priority to “collegiality”; and they obstruct, in so far as they can, criticism of “their own” ... there are pressures to shut people up: social pressures, use of bylaws, use of the pecking order, intimidation, etc. (Falcone, 1991, p. 38)

In effect, these forces and pressures that Lang alluded to are some of the many mechanisms and tactics that can be employed in democratic societies to silence scholars and their ideas. One paradoxical tactic that can be employed is to abandon—rather than uphold—the principles of academic freedom when a scholar is under attack for saying or writing things that upset others in the academic’s discipline. The Beck trial, described earlier, provides an example. Dunn (1993) wrote that Beck’s “fearless stand for free speech did not endear him to the mandarins of art history. Indeed, the editor of *The Burlington Magazine*, an elevated forum for artistic debate ... observed privately during the trial that Beck was going to lose so there was not much point in supporting him” (p. 18). Such an attitude would seem to imply that what Beck said or wrote was somehow out of bounds, and the right of freedom of expression must stay within those bounds. As seen later, such bounds are not necessarily strictly legalistic ones, at least in the opinions of some scholars. There are also bounds determined by orthodoxy.